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System and Sales in the Heartland:
A Manufacturing and Marketing
History of the Hart-Parr Company,
1901-1929
MARK R. FINLAY
IN THE SUMMER OF 1993 a tractor plant in Charles City,
Iowa, dosed its doors. Four hundred twenty employees of the
White-New Idea Farm Equipment Company lost their jobs, a
small fraction of the nearly three thousand who had worked
there in the early 1970s. Since that time, Charles City's tractor
plant had suffered through various energy and farm crises,
mounting indebtedness, multiple corporate buyouts, two bank-
ruptcies, and years of downsizing, all the while trying to pro-
duce farm equipment for a shrinking domestic market. Exten-
sive efforts to find another buyer proved unsuccessful. Finally,
in October 1993, the plant's remaining viable machines and
other assets were sold off at a week-long auction. For months
thereafter, successful bidders hauled off their spoils, many of
them destined for the booming economy of the People's Re-
public of China.' One former foundry employee recalled that
1. Des Moines Register, 18 and 22 November 1992 and 31 October 1993; "Knee-
Deep in Debt," Fortune (18 September 1989), 88.
This project was supported by a research grant funded by the State Histori-
cal Society of Iowa, and had its origins in papers prepared for the 1994 Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute directed by Alan I
Marcus, and for Iowa Heritage EXPO '97.1 also would like to thank Michael
Price, Maria Sajwan, Doug Strawser, Bob Bennett, Mary Ann Townsend, and
the Annals of Iowa's reviewers for their advice, help, and support. The paper
is dedicated to Charles Applegate.
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watching five flatbeds carry the sand silos out of town was like
watching "a funeral march."^ Today, the site is nothing but two
dozen acres of barren land.
Early in this century, however, Charles City was an impor-
tant manufacturing center. Residents still boast that their town
was the "birthplace of the farm tractor/' There, in 1901, the
Hart-Parr Company produced the first commercially successful
gasoline tractor, and the company dominated the North Ameri-
can tractor market for several years thereafter. By 1907, about
one-third of all the tractors in the world were manufactured in
Charles City. Hart-Parr tractors were powerful, long-lasting, fuel
efficient, and technically innovative, and they sold well in both
national and intemational markets.^ By the early 1910s, the Hart-
Parr Company was receiving considerable national attention for
its innovative manufacturing processes, its management style,
and the efficient and systematic engineering it employed in its
plant and its products. On the surface, Hart-Parr's vision of the
plant, work force, and marketplace seemed to exemplify the
ideals that shaped American technology and business history in
the early twentieth century.
The company's fortunes shifted drastically in the decade after
1913. After flawed business decisions during World War I dev-
astated the firm's markets and reputation, stockholders brought
in a new management team that rejected the earlier ethos of ef-
ficiency and engineering, embracing instead new strategies of
2. Jack Sobolik, interview with author, Charles City, Iowa, 3 July 1994.
3. For solid discussions of the tractors themselves (not an emphasis of this
article), see C. H. Wendel, Oliver Hart-Parr (Osceola, WI, 1993); C. H. Wendel,
Encyclopedia of American Farm Tractors (Sarasota, FL, 1979); and R. Douglas
Hurt, Agricultural Technology in the Twentieth Century (Manhattan, KS, 1991).
Hart-Parr tractors boasted a number of technical advantages and innovations.
Designed mainly to compete with teams of horses and steam engines that
helped plow virgin lands and wheat fields, these machines were extremely
heavy and powerful. One Hart-Parr model weighed twenty-six tons, with the
horsepower to pull fourteen plows at once. Before World War I, the principal
market was in the northem Great Plains of the United States and Canada.
Hart-Parr also had success in agriculturally similar regions overseas, including
parts of Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Balkans, Argentina, and Australia.
After the First World War, the sales territory within the United States broad-
ened to include forty states, and there were enough foreign markets to war-
rant the motto, "The Sun Never Sets on Hart-Parr."
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production, marketing, and labor relations. Finally, in 1929,
Hart-Parr joined the industrywide trend of mergers between
tractor and implement manufacturers.
Mass production and scientific management are major
themes in the history of early twentieth-century rrxanufacturing.
Standard versions of American economic history emphasize
the triumphant and inevitable emergence of centralized and
efficient forms of production, management, and labor control.
Fordism, as one component of the model was known, became
identified with several irmovatioris, including the manufacture
of large volumes of standardized products, the use of special-
purpose machine tools to fashion interchangeable parts, and the
development of dynamic assembly processes. Following Alfred
Chandler's lead, a generation of historians of American busi-
ness has highlighted the organizational and managerial revolu-
tion that taught the business elite to govern large factories and
vast corporations through a new class of middle managers
willing and able to instill a corporate culture. In a parallel vein,
labor historians have focused on managers' and manufacturers'
expanding abilities to control the shop fioor work force through
time management studies and innovations in training and com-
pensation that fostered a "deskilling" of the labor force. In brief,
the traditional view assumes that management and engineering
merged around the tum of the century to form and solidify
American industrial capitalism.*
Recently, historians have begun to reevaluate the centrality
of mass production in the history of manufacturing.^ Many
4. Daniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in tlw
United States, 1880-1920 (Madison, WI, 1975); David A. Hounshell, From the
American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufac-
turing Technology in the United States (Baltimore, 1984); Samuel Haber, Efficiency
and Uplifl: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago,
1964); David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and tlie Rise of Cor-
porate Capitalism (New York, 1979); and Alfred D. Chandler jr., Tlie Visible Hand:
Vie Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977).
5. Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Pro-
duction: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industriali-
zation," Past & Present 108 (1985), 13S-76; Philip Scranton, "Manufacturing
Diversity: Production Systems, Markets, and an American Consumer Sodety,
1870-1930," Technology and Culture 35 (1994), 476-505; John K. Brown, The
Baldwin Loœmotive Works, 1830-1915: A Study in American Industrial Practice
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manufacturers found the methods of mass production ill suited
to their industries and markets, for mass production required
substantial investments in equipment and engendered ter\se
struggles to increase productivity, market share, and labor effi-
ciency. Batch production^ whereby goods were made in small
lots, offered manufacturers an alternative strategy that empha-
sized marketing, the ability to respond to market changes, and
the negotiation of flexible working relationships with employ-
ees, subcontractors, and customers. The net result was that
models of batch production and flexible production remained
viable long after the heyday of Fordism. As this study shows,
though Charles Hart hirnself claimed that he was "a great ad-
mirer of a certain automobile manufacturer," mass production
was not, in the long term, well suited to tractor manufacturing
in a small Iowa town.*^
The history of "the Hart-Parr," as it was known in the local
parlance, also helps us understand the emerging boundaries of
corporate responsibility in the early twentieth-century United
States. Recent studies of welfare capitalism have shown that
such practices were rooted neither in generosity and altruism,
as company histories imply, nor in the blatant forms of anti-
unionism and corporate hegemony that critics allege.'^  As the
head of the dominant industry in a small Iowa town, Charles
Hart was in a position to shape relations with his workers and
the commuruty at large in several ways. Influenced by the So-
cial Gospel, Hart surely had a sincere belief that he could play
an important role in uplifting the working class. At the same
time, however, he was in a position to directly benefit from the
firm's welfare programs.
(Baltimore, 1994); Stephen Meyer, "Technology and the Workplace: Skilled and
Production Workers at Allis-Chalmers, 1900-1941," Technology and Culture 29
(1988), 839-64; Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and Amer-
ican Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, NJ, 1997).
6. Hart quoted in Edward Mott Wooley, "Secrets of Business Success, III: C. W.
Hart," The World's Work Qanuary 1914), 350.
7. Andrea Tone, The Business of Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism in Progres-
sive America (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capital-
ism, 1880-1940 (Chicago, 1976); H. M, Gitelman, "Welfare Capitalism Recon-
sidered," Labor History 33 (1992), 5-31; and Wilson J. Warren, "Evangelical
Paternalism and Divided Workers: The Nonunion Era at John Morrell and
Company in Ottumwa, 1877-1917," Annals of ¡owa 56 (1997), 321-48.
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Charles W. Hart, 1872-1937 (I.) and Charles H. Parr, 1868-1941 (r.).
Photos courtesy Floyd County Historical Society (hereaßer FCHS).
BOTH CHARLES HART AND CHARLES PARR grew up
in the rural Midwest, and both recognized from their teenage
years that small engines, easy and economical to operate, had
a great potential market among rural Americans.* Patents on
the first successful internal combustion engine, invented by
Nikolaus Otto in 1876, had expired by the early 1890s, creating
8. Available biographical materials include Jack Gilluly, "He Realized a
Dream: The Story of C. W. Hart," unpublished manuscript, 1981, State His-
torical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, chaps. 2-6. The manuscript is paginated
separately within each chapter, but individual chapters are not numbered.
For ease of citation, I have created chapter numbers. Also, see C. H. Parr,
"History of the Hart-Parr Company," in "Life of Charles Walter Hart,"
manuscript in vertical files, n.d., Floyd County Historical Society (hereafter
FCHS), Charles City, Iowa; "Life of Charles Walter Hart" [ca. 1917], copied
from Iowa and Its Foremost Citizens, in vertical files, FCHS; and "Iowa's Great
Tractor Factory," Iozm Factories 1 (May 1912), 10-17. An early trade catalog
indicates that Hart and Parr predicted an extensive market for power ma-
chinery: The "day is not far distant when every blacksmith shop, elevator,
restaurant, creamery, country residence, feed mill, isolated electric lighting
plant, bakery, laundry, butcher shop or shop of any kind will be provided
with an internal combustion engine for power." The Hart-Parr Company,
"Gasolene [sic] Engines" (Madison, WI, [ca. 1900]), in vertical files, FCHS.
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a flurry of interest in the machine.' Charles Hart first studied
engineering at Iowa State CoUege before transferring to the
University of Wisconsin, where he met Wisconsin-bom Charles
Parr at the registration tables. As part of their senior honors
thesis in mechanical engineering, the two men produced five
working intemal combustion engines. By the time they gradu-
ated in 1896, they had formed the Hart and Parr Company of
Madison.'" Although his degree was in engineering. Hart later
declared that his tenure at the Elliott Business College in Bur-
lington, Iowa, had a greater impact on his career. There, the cur-
riculum stressed student role-playing in virtually all of the of-
fice tasks useful for the emerging class of white-collar manag-
ers." In 1901 the company accepted an offer of bank loans, land
grants, and tax breaks to move operations to a three-hundred-
square-foot building in Charles City, near the Floyd County
farm where Hart had grown up.'^ Soon after this relocation, the
sales success of Hart-Parr tractors persuaded the company to
drop its line of stationary engines and to expand tractor manu-
facturing operations. By that time, Charles Hart had gained
control of the firm's management; Charles Parr was no longer a
central participant in company operations."
9. C. H. Wendel, American Gasoline Engines since 1872 (Sarasota, FL, 1983).
10. C. W. Hart and C. H. Parr, "Intemal Combustion Engines," Wisconsin ^
neer I (1896-97), 192-203, 338-44, 452-57, 599-604, and ibid. 2 (1897), 43-50.
Their thesis contair\s a survey of the history of intemal combustion engines.
11. Information on the curriculum from Twenty-Seventh Annual Catalogue:
Elliott's Business CoUege and Elliott's School of Shorthand (Burlington, IA, 1905).
I would Uke to thank Joanne Guest of the Burlington Public Library for sup-
plying the photocopies. Hart's comment on the value of his Burlington edu-
cation is from Gilluly, "He Realized a Dream," chap. 39, p. 3.
12. C. H. Parr, "History of the Hart-Parr Company."
13. Charles Parr's history of the firm does not reveal the reason for his rela-
tively minor role in company management, and betrays no bittemess over
the situation. A 1908 article described him as the "night watchman." When
he and Hart were oiasted from the board in the 1917 management change.
Parr remained on the staff as head of the Engineering Department. Parr also
served on the school board for several terms beginning in 1913. Charles City
Daily Intelligencer (hereafter CCDJ), 15 October 1908, 6 and 11 March 1913,
and 7 June 1917; Charles City Daily Press (hereafter CCDP), 1 June 1917.
Charles Parr left the firm in 1923, though he later retumed to the payroll as a
consultant. See "C. H. Parr Goes to New Position," Tïmce a Week News (here-
after TAWN), 23 November 1923.
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Contrast the text accompanying this caricature of Charles Parr with
that on the one of Charles Hart (see cover). The contrast clearly suggests
Parr's lesser role in the firm's development. From Hart-Parr's company
magazine. Field and Factory 2 (20 January 1917).
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As employment grew from 15 in 1901 to about 1,800 in 1917,
the firm reshaped the physical and social character of Charles
City." The huge plant dominated the northem edge of the city,
overtaking twenty-four acres of farmland and stockyards to
create a noisy and smoky landscape of factory buildings, fuel
tanks, company-owned railroad tracks, and vast piles of sand,
coal, ash, and iron dust.'"^  Beyond the factory complex, com-
muter rail lines, tenement housing, working-class cafes, and the
neighborhoods of a new managerial class extended into lands
that the company purchased from retiring farmers. Hart-Parr's
influence reached still farther beyond Charles City's bounda-
ries: it connected fanners on the midwestem and Great Plains
prairies with the urban industrial economy; it brought the ma-
chinery and capital of eastem industrialists and financiers to the
rural Midwest; it established ties with agents who promoted the
company from outposts in Canada, Europe, South America, and
Africa; and it attracted to Charles City hundreds and then thou-
sands of skilled and unskilled workers from rural Iowa, the
Midwest, eastem Europe, and elsewhere seeking employment
with the company^*
14. Employment data from Cameron W. Hanson and Heather M. Hull, eds..
Past Harvests: A Floyd County History to 1996 (Charles City, 1996), 103; Iowa
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Twelfth Biennial Report, 1905 (Des Moines, 1907),
230-31; idem. Thirteenth Biennial Report, 1906-1907 (Des Moines, 1908), 300-
301; idem. Fourteenth Biennial Report, Í908-1909 (Des Moines, 1910), 388-89;
and Charles City Press and Evening Intelligencer (hereafter CCPET), 9 August
1916 and 20 August 1919. The newspaper was at times labeled Charles City
Daily Press and Evening Intelligencer, but CCPEI will be used for either.
15. Sanbom Map Company, Fire Insurance Map, Charles City, 1924, maps 9
and 10, FCHS.
16. For recent studies of the industrial history of Iowa and the Midwest, see
Ralph Schamau, "The Labor Movement in Iowa, 1900-1910," Journal of the
West 35 (April 1996), 19-28; Keach Johnson, "Iowa's Industrial Roots: Some
Social and Political Problems," Annals of Iowa 44 (1979), 247-77; Shelton
Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Iowa Labor in the Twenti-
eth Century (Iowa City, 1993), 1-11; and Daniel Nelson, Farm and Factory:
Workers in the Midwest, 1880-1990 (Bloomington, IN, 1995). Historical geog-
raphers provide useful analyses of the spatial relationships of an emerging
agro-indus trial complex; see David R. Meyer, "Emergence of the Manufac-
turing Belt: An Interpretation," journal of Historical Geography 9 (1983), 145-
74; and Brian Page, "Across the Great Divide: Agriculture and Industrial Ge-
ography," Economic Geography 72 (1996), 376-97. Between 1900 and 1909,
Iowa's rural population dropped 7 percent, while few of the state's new set-
The Hart-Parr Co. 345
This 1908 photograph shows the expanding Hart-Parr plant's encroach-
ment on its environs. Photo courtesy FCHS.
In 1907 the firm began a tremendous expansion of its indus-
trial space. Hart envisioned the factory as an organic machine,
and seized the opportunity to implement his strategies of indus-
trial engineering and factory management through the plant's
architecture, infrastructure, layout of the grounds, and selection
and arrangement of the machinery. With the permission of the
city council, the firm relocated railroad tracks, blocked off city
streets, and appropriated the formerly public land as company
property. Beneath the streets lay the plaint's circulatory system, a
1,200-foot network of concrete tunnels that carded wires for
electricity and telephone, and pipes for water and sewage.'^ The
buildings incorporated innovations in design and in their use of
materials, particularly through Hart's enthusiastic support for
reinforced concrete as a building material. Concrete buildings
were not only appropriate for bearing the weight of hundreds
of machine tools and tons of raw rxxaterials; they also served a
tiers were able to obtain farmland. To a large degree, those seeking jobs in
that era had to tum to the state's urban areas and factory towns. Grace M.
Zorbaugh, "Farm Background of Country Migrants to Iowa Industries," ¡owa
Joumal of History and Politics 34 (1936), 312-18.
17. "Iowa's Great Tractor Pactory," 11; CCDI, 26 July 1906,11 May and 2 Sep-
tember 1907; Minutes, Charles City City Council, Book E, 19 November 1906,
and Book P, 7 October 1907,15 June 1908, and 7 June 1909, City Hall, Charles
City. Por more on the ideology of industrial plant design, see Lindy Biggs,
The Rational Factory: Architecture, Technology, and Work in America's Age of Mass
Production (Baltimore, 1996).
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managerial function. By offering more open spaces, they pro-
vided better sight lines for managerial supervision, better light-
ing, and greater stability for workers operating heavy machines.
Hart also examined the ventilation system, recognizing that
modifications in the work envirorunent affected workers' pro-
ductivity. Reports make clear that efficiency, rather than worker
comfort, was the principal goal."
Charles Hart aggressively tried to bring an industrial and
engineering mentality to Charles City. Not surprisingly, the lo-
cal media were willing allies. Hart wrote a weekly column for
the Charles City Daily Intelligencer, using his space to publicize
positive developments at "the Hart-Parr." The newspaper's
editor participated by urging all citizens to thank Hart-Parr for
its contributions to the city and for its leniency with employees
during hard times. During the plant's expar\sion phase, the
newspaper promised that it was "worth a fifty-mile joumey"
simply to see the crane that hovered over the site, and encour-
aged readers to purchase a ticket on the platform to observe the
construction.'' Local newspapers also opposed labor activism,
pollution controls, and anything else that might threaten corpo-
rate interests; one operüy admitted that it had no intention of
publishing news about layoffs or sales slumps.^ The local me-
dia's most consistent theme was to encourage local real estate
agents and landlords to create ever more housing for the Hart-
Parr work force. The persistence of such calls, however, sug-
gests that many understood that as Hart-Parr's labor force
fluctuated, any investment in housing for rural Iowa's indus-
trial workers carried some risk.
18. Before 1907, parts of the buildings were exposed to Iowa's extreme winters,
prompting the local newspaper to report that workers were "quite jubilant
over the anticipation of a more tropical climate." To ameliorate conditions in
the summer months, Hart designed a system for spraying a mist of water
through giant fans. CCPEl, 1 July 1916; and unidentified newspaper clip-
ping, 31 October 1907, Hart-Parr vertical files, FCHS.
19. CCDI, 20 June and 2 July 1907. Editors also promised that it was "worth a
day's travel" simply to see a toggle press punch steel. CCDI, 2 March 1909.
20. According to the CCDI, 23 February 1914, "the less said about such mat-
ters the better." The newspaper expressed lukewarm support for a proposed
smoke abatement ordinance that lingered in city council debates for more
than a year before being rejected in 1911. CCDI, 21 September 1910 and 4
October 1911.
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Hart took a personal interest in sales and believed that his
customers should embrace his enthusiasm for engineering and
expertise. He considered it a duty to teach farmers to think of
the gasoline tractor as "the true secret of power efficiency in ag-
riculture," and stressed that time savings, rather than profits,
offered the tractor's main advantage over the horse. As one
manager wrote in an article titled "Educating the Consumer to
Use Tractors," the fanner who used a tractor anything less than
one hundred days per year "detracts fix)m [its] efficiency." In its
print advertisings featuring themes of power, efficiency, and
quality, the firm aimed to convince farmers to embrace "power
fanning." Some advertisements devoted as many column
inches to describing and illustrating the factory as the tractor. In
effect, the firm hoped to convince fanners that simply owning a
Hart-Parr tractor would impart important values of engineering
and efficiency by linking tiiem with the perfection of Charles
City's manufacturing process.^'
The company also brought its message directly onto the
farm. By 1908, for every eight tractors it sold, Hart-Parr em-
ployed one so-called "expert" to advise customers on how to
make repairs and maximize productivity. In 1911 the firm intro-
duced another innovation, the Hart-Pan School of Traction
Farming and Traction Engineering, a series of lessons available
via correspondence for potential customers and farmers who
had purchased a Hart-Pan machine. Students were instructed
to "study systematically and carefully.... do it with system
do not let pleasure or other work interfere with your study
hours if you can possibly avoid it." Each of the fifteen lessons
included a quiz that students sent in to Charles City to be
graded by staff members. Those who scored below 70 percent
on any quiz were expected to try again. Whatever success this
program may have had, farmers still had a difficult mechanical
task in front of them: the 1912 Hart-Parr model, for instance.
21. CCDI, 20 April 1907; C. H. Hart, "The Gas Traction Engine in Agriculture,"
Gas Review 1 (January 1908), 8-11. C. V. Hull, "Educating the Consumer to
Use Tractors," farm Implement News 34 (26 June 1913); Hart-Parr advertise-
ment, American Thresherman 14 Qanuary 1913), 2.
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included nineteen instructions just to start the engine and
twelve to stop it.^
Hart-Parr's manufacturing ethos also extended to its net-
work of dealers and white-collar employees. Dealer conven-
tions typically began with day-long tours of the plant and thor-
ough lessons on the engineering ideas that lay behind specific
machining operations. Meals featured dishes inspired by the
factory tour, with menu items such as "Ball Bearings with Cup
Grease" as the vegetable and "Graham Bread Baked by Gaso-
line Heat." Festivities also included role-playing; at a time when
the firm was trying to drum up enthusiasm for a new line of
small tractors known as the Little Devil, dealers took on roles as
members of the Little Devil Order under the authority of a
Hart-Parr manager posing as "His High and Sataruc Majesty.""
In 1916 Hart laid off several branch managers and tumed to
more "outside experts" to make sales calls. In the interest of
streamlining this effort, the firm purchased a block of homes in
Charles City to house the typists and stenographers who sent a
programmatic series of six letters to prospective customers. The
whole system, far more impersonal than other firms' sales strat-
egies, was not successful.^ "*
HART-PARR'S OPERATIONS had important ramifications
for the demography and social history of Charles City. The
company's continual demand for industrial workers fostered
22. [Hart-Parr Company], Traction Farming and Traction Engineering: A Course
of Study Given by Correspondence for the Benefit of All Those Interested in the Ap-
plication of Mechanical Power to Various Tasks of the Farm (Charles City, [ca.
1912-13]); [Hart-Parr Company], Instructions for the Operation and Care of
Hart-Parr 40 B. H. R Tractor (Charles City, 1912); [Hart-Parr Company], In-
structions for the Operation and Care of Hart-Parr 45 and 60 B. H. P. Tractors
(Charles City, 1912).
23. CCDI, 7 January 1907; CCPEÍ, 20 December 1915; Charles City Daily News
(hereafter CCDN), 19 March 1921. Such festivities clearly seem designed to
solidify the agents' connections with the Charles City corporate culture. For
a social history of the shaping of corporate culture in middle management,
see Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990).
24. A. E. Mills, "History of Hart-Parr Co., Founders of the Tractor Industry"
(1959), 18, unpublished manuscript, folder 81, box 83, F Hal Higgins Collec-
tion, Department of Special Collections, Shields Library, University of Cali-
fomia, Davis.
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the spread of the manufacturing mentality in northem Iowa. A
company booklet titled "Men Wanted" boasted that the firm's
commitment to system and efficiency in the manufacturing
process meant that it did not need to take advantage of its em-
ployees because it could be particular in selecting its work
force. According to the booklet, the company wanted "only
such employees as will be interested in increasing to the highest
plane, the health, beauty, temperance, morality, and general
good of the place." In particular, labor recruiters sought "yotmg
married men who show by work and reputation that they are
industrious, saving, temperate, and of high moral character."^
They also welcomed "good, bright, farmer boys," ministers
seeking supplemental income, and Iowa State College engi-
neering students inteming during the surruner.^ *^  These pur-
ported goals notwithstanding, the company also hired a large
number of immigrants, including natives of Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, Russia, Italy, Mexico, and one worker from India.
The most sigrüficant addition to Charles City's demography
was a contingent of nearly one hundred Serbians, most of
whom were natives of a small comer of Herzegovina in the
Habsburg Empire."
At Hart-Parr, housing the work force became an important
element in a strategy of corporate hegemony. Insisting that "the
class of men desired should not be satisfied to live in rented
25. Hart-Parr Company, "Men Wanted," [1909], FCHS; CCDI, 23 July 1909.
26. CCDI, 3 August 1907; CCPEI, 13 June 1916 and 23 April 1919.
27. Immigration data based on a database of 1,129 employees, obtained
through a study of the Records of the Selective Service System, 1917-1918,
RG 163, National Archives, Southeast Branch; United States Bureau of the
Census, Census of 1920, and nev/spaper sources. Hart-Parr employed a total
of about 130 foreign-bom workers in 1917 and 1920. Most of those from
Germany and Scandinavia had arrived in Floyd County before Hart-Parr
opened, whereas most of those from southern and eastern Europe arrived
after 1905, and may have come to Charles City specifically to work at the
plant. In the early twentieth century, nearly all Serb immigrants to the
United States came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not from Serbia. As
a result, census and Selective Service enumerators often labeled them as
Austrians; at times, my analysis reflects a guess of who was Serbian, based
on last name, housing pattems, and/or town of origin. Serbs from the Her-
zegovina region often emigrated due to declining soil fertility in their region,
as well as political pressures within the Habsburg Empire. See Branko Mita
Colakovic, Yugoslav Migrations to America (San Francisco, 1973), 21-62.
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homes," the company opened its own real estate office as part
of the plant expansion in 1907. Hart-Parr also irütiated its own
home-building program. By 1913, the company controlled nearly
four hundred home lots and offered to finance employees'
homes at 6 percent interest over a six-year mortgage, payable
through payroll deductior\s.^ The company's rhetoric and poli-
cies with regard to housing may have appealed to the native-
bom homeowners who formed the core of the Hart-Parr work
force, but many workers still found their housing in the YMCA,
tenement apartments, or the all-concrete apartment complex
known as "The DeWop Hotel" that the firm constructed across
the tracks from the plant.^
Early twentieth-century business leaders recognized that
controlling workers' time was a more prudent strategy than ne-
gotiating with them on wages and benefits. Control of workers'
leisure time enhanced a company's influence over its employees
while simultaneously reir\forcing workers' notioi\s of mascu-
linity and domestic hegemony.*' Insisting that the dty needed
"amusements . . . get-at-able [sic] reading material . . . [a]nd
plenty of sane and healthy recreation" to attract quality workers.
Hart led local drives to support the Chautauqua circuit, sum-
mer recreation programs, and the YMCA.^ ' The city's so-called
"Manhood Factory," the YMCA, opened in January 1912. Its
eight hundred members in 1914 reportedly made the Charles
28. Many of these houses remain in Charles City's north-side neighborhoods.
CCD¡, 12 June 1907, 27 May 1909, and 5, 12, 19, and 25 April 1913. For an
excellent analysis of such strategies on the national level, see Tone, The Busi-
ness of Benevolence, 68-80.
29. The name was intended to disparagingly describe its predominantly Ser-
bian residents. Hart's enthusiasm for concrete backfired in this case, since ice
routinely crusted on the interior walls during the Iowa winters. Little remains
of a second neighborhood of concrete houses that the firm constructed. Prom
unidentified clipping, no date or source, "Aided in Hotel 'DeWop' Construc-
tion," vertical files, "Hart-Parr Co.," FCHS. See also Mills, "History of Hart-
Parr Co."
3D. See, for example. Tone, The Bitsiness of Benevolence, 72; Wayne E. Lewchuk,
"Men and Monotony: Fratemalism as a Managerial Strategy at the Ford
Motor Company," Joumal of Economic History 53 (1993), 824-56; and Lisa Fine,
'"Our Big Factory Family': Masculinity and Paternalism at the REO Motor
Company of Lansing, Michigan," Labor History 34 (1993), 274-91.
31. CCDI, 1 june 1907; Otis, Our Ellises, 52-53.
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City "Y" the largest in the nation for a town its size. With pro-
grams and sixty-eight rooms clearly designed for company em-
ployees, the facility gained a reputation as a "Hart-Parr club."
The YMCA candidly revealed its efforts at social engineering in
classes that focused on physical training and business and lead-
ership skills. "Working boys" received special attention; in-
structors boasted that "every boy in the class has been taught
the value of discipline and made to respect authority" and that
"smoking, swearing, smut, etc. are fast disappearing." For its
part, the company pressured its employees to contribute to the
YMCA fund and permitted ministers from the YMCA to offer
lunchtime sermons for workers in the factory, particularly dur-
ing times of potential labor unrest."
The "Tractor Inn" in downtown Charles City represented
another component of the company's paternalistic program for
its employees. A club open to Hart-Parr employees, provided
they were of "good character/' this three-story facility featured
dormitory rooms for transient employees, billiard tables, a
cafeteria, and an auditorium for speakers, debates, dances, and
mock trials. The Tractor Inn also provided gym equipment and
hosted weekly wrestling and boxing matches between Hart-
Parr employees and itinerant challengers, permitting workers to
vent their aggressiveness against punching bags and out-of-
towners rather than management. The complex offered pro-
grams for employees' children, too; ceremonies were held to
initiate the so-called Unfinished Iron Castings into the mysteries
of the "Uttle Devil Order."""
32. CCDP, 29 June 1916; CCPEI, 9 January 1915, 8 December 1917,19 March
1919, 6 January 1920. Five hundred sixty-six Hart-Parr workers, or about 30
percent of the work force, contributed to the YMCA fund in 1917. CCPEI, 19
November 1917. See also Clyde Griffen, "Preface: Towards a Future History
of the YMCA," in Men and Women Adrift: The YMCA and the Y^NCA in the
City, ed. Nina Mjagkij and Margaret Spratt (New York, 1997); and Warren,
"Evangelical Paternalism and Divided Workers," 331-33. The national
YMCA apparently had no record of the existence of the Charles City "Y." It
must have been locally organized with no formal affiliation with the national
organization. Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota, St.
Paul.
33. "Tractor Inn': A Big, New Club House for Hart-Parr Folks," Hart-Parr
Field and Factory 1 (December 1916), 5; CCPEI, 18 November and 16 Decem-
ber 1916,3 January 1917.
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Hart-Parr was not above using intimidation to achieve its
goals. Discipline on the factory floor was enforced by Hart
himself. When he walked down the line, even a worker who
was related to Hart knew not to say hello. The same employee
recalled that after the plant converted to wartime production, a
husky man armed wiüi a pistol strolled the line to ensure disci-
pline and deter espionage.
Most of the company's policies, however, were couched in
language designed to persuade workers to embrace its corpo-
rate culture. Consider the company's holiday and vacation poli-
cies, for example. Employees were encouraged to take one to
two weeks of unpaid vacation each year, but only four holidays
—also impaid—^were approved because the company believed
"that nation is most degenerate which has the most holidays."
Periodically, the company announced sudden "vacations"—
unexpected reductions in the hourly workers' schedule, justi-
fied in terms of allowing workers to get extra sleep, to spend
more time with their families, or to "get closer to nature."^
Like other industrial concems interested in maximizing pro-
ductivity, Hart-Pan used benefit programs to secure employees'
loyalty The Hart-Pan Relief Organization, for ir\stance, offered
long-term employee benefits in the case of accident or sickness.
Funded through payroll deductions, with the company contrib-
uting orüy the admirüstrative costs, the plan, like similar pro-
grams elsewhere in the country, promised specified benefits—
three times one's weekly salary for the loss of a finger, fifty
times one's salary for the loss of one foot and one hand, and so
on—^provided that the injxiries were not attributed to "improper
or immoral conduct, or . . . the use of intoxicating liquors." The
program also limited the company's liability in the case of seri-
ous accident. '^
34. Gilluly, "He Realized a Dream," chap. 56, pp. 2-5.
35. Hart-Parr Company, "Men Wanted"; CCDI, 18 May 1907; CCPEI, 19 June
1916 and 10 April 1919.
36. "Constitution of the Hart-Parr Relief Association" (n.d.); "Employees'—
miscellaneous," vertical files, FCHS. Although it generated considerable
publicity, it is unlikely that many workers joined the plan, and the company
eventually dropped this benefit, perhaps during World War I. In 1919, 285
Hart-Parr employees (41 percent) were members of fratemal orgarúzations,'
which used accident and life insurance as one of their main selling points.
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Many Hart-Parr workers learned to embrace the ethos of
industrialism even as they endured a loud, dirty, and noxious
work environment. Workers purportedly accepted these dan-
gers as the price of their job, and were likely to boast of chewing
tobacco dipped in cylinder oil or working with greasy hands as
a "badge of honor."" Nonetheless, about twenty workers suf-
fered injuries each day. Although most accidents resulted in
minor cuts, scrapes, or bits of emery or steel in the eyes, news-
paper notices were full of cases of serious workplace injuries:
Jesse Smith's skull was crushed when a pin on a hydraulic press
broke; John Yancey's skin came off his body "in shreds" after a
naphtha explosion; Joe Miller had a leg amputated after it w a^s
crushed by a falling steel beam; and E B. Tubbs was badly
burned when a coworker tossed a match into the pail of gaso-
line in which Tubbs was washing his hands. Yet workplace
safety did not emerge as a serious issue during the Hart-Parr
era, and the firm was able to defuse public concerns by initiat-
ing safety campaigns and establishing its own clinic with a
nurse employed full-time at the plant site after 1919.^ ^
Perhaps one Charles City family symbolizes the hardships
and opporturüties that Hart-Parr, like other American industrial
concerns, offered in the early twentieth century. Luka ("Louis")
Micich, a native of "Austrian" Herzegovina, came to the United
States in about 1903; his wife, whom he met for the first time on
the docks of New York City through an arranged marriage, ar-
rived a few years later. After a stint in the wire-making industry
Based on an untitled list of Hart-Parr employees by fraternal affiliation, c.
1919, in vertical files, FCHS. See also C. H. Parr, "History of the Hart-Parr
Company"; Louis Boettiger, Employee Welfare Work: A Critical and Historical
Study (New York, 1923); and, for a related case in Iowa's industrial history,
Wilson J. Warren, "The Welfare Capitalism of John Morrell and Company,
1922-1937," Annals of Iowa 47 (1984), 497-517.
37. CCDI, 25 October, 27 July, 3 August, and 18 May 1907; CCPEI, 9 Septem-
ber 1919.
38. Notable accidents are described in Floyd County Advocate, 27 August
1907; CCDI, 1 April, 24 June, and 20 July 1909, 22 September 1910, and 11
October 1917; Charles City Evening Intelligencer (hereafter CCEI), 23 February,
8 and 11 June, 9 July, and 23 November 1915; CCPEI, 1 March, 2 September,
10 and 20 October, and 18 December 1916, 9 January 1918, and 10 July 1919.
The Hart-Parr clinic and its nurse received attention in CCPEI, 24 February, 8
April, and 23 August 1919.
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in DeKalb, Illinois, the Micich family came to Charles City as
operations expanded during World War I. Micich worked in-
termittently for twenty-two years under the harsh conditions of
the Hart-Parr (and, later, Oliver) foundry and shop floor, before
succumbing to silicosis and dying in 1941. Circumstances im-
proved for the next generation, however. Bom in one of Hart-
Parr's tiny cement homes at the hands of a Serbian midwife, the
family's children stayed in Charles City through the rise and fall
of the plant; local union support enabled one son, Mike Micich,
to be elected mayor of Charles City in 1952.^ '
CHARLES HART'S SYSTEM of rewards and punishments
was designed to mold a work force committed to the company's
goals. Health benefits to long-term workers fostered a gendered
attitude of employees' responsibility to remain the family bread-
winner. The promotion of housing facilities for both long-term
and transient employees prepared the company for fluctuations
in labor demands. The encouragement of athletics and other en-
tertainment circixmscribed workers' choices in the orüy hours of
the day left to their own discretion. And the attention that Hart-
Parr's welfare programs generated played a significant role in
establishing a positive image for the firm and for the commu-
nity. But oüier aspects of Hart-Parr's manufacturing processes
also attracted attention from the nation's industrial and man-
agement press in the years before World War I.
The comments of one business journalist typified the gen-
eral admiration of the firm's efficiency, lauding the firm's
"smooth machinelike action" and its "neat and harmonious
plant," and describing Hart-Parr's "greatest efficiency [as its]
true knowledge of costs and business upon the surest and safest
lines."*' The company's claim that "the matter of interchange-
39. Information on the Micich family comes from Lozo Micich, interview
with author, Charles City, Iowa, 5 July 1998, and Helen Webster, interview
with author, Charles City, Iowa, 4 July 1998; Records of the Selective Service
System, 1918; CCDP, 17 November 1918; Citarles City Press (hereafter CCP),
23 September 1941; and Delbert Volkes, interview, 15 June 1982, Iowa Labor
History Oral Project, State Historical Society of Iowa. I would like to thank
Mark Smith and Mary Bennett for permission to use the Volkes interview.
40. "Iowa's Great Tractor Factory," 11.
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The factory assembly area in the Charles City Hart-Parr plant, c. 1915.
Photo courtesy FCHS.
ability is a very live question" also attracted attention, as the
company boasted that virtually all tractor parts were fashioned
at the Hart-Parr plant. Like Ford, Hart designed several of his
own "ingeruous" special machine tools, most driven by indi-
vidual electric motors, permitting the flexible and rational ar-
rangement of men and machines.'" Hart-Parr's admirers also
commented on the efficient telephone and communication sys-
terr\s. Since many of the employees who hauled materials
throughout the plant were "illiterate" immigrants, the company
designed a numerical code to deliver ir\structions. Reportedly,
"even the dullest" truckers could do their jobs with few mis-
takes. The large planning board that governed the use of ma-
41. Hart-Parr Company, Gasoline Engines: Traction, Portable, Stationary (Charles
City, 1906), folder 84, box 83, Higgins Collection.
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chine tools also impressed observers. Using a complicated sys-
tem of colored wooden blocks, each color designating a specific
machine tool and the length of each block designating the
length of time that the job required, plarmers could schedule
well in advance the optimal use of each machine tool." A simi-
lar technique using colored tacks permitted managers to ob-
serve the status and supply of each part needed for final assem-
bly on the erecting floor without the "difficult and tiresome"
method of "turning the pages of old-fashioned records."*^ Busi-
ness writers also respected Hart's shrewdness in founding the
Charles City Westem Railway, an interurban line that both
linked the plant with additional competitors for its freight busi-
ness and served as an important commuter line for Hart-Parr
employees."
The plant's electricity generating system was perhaps the
most impressive and ominous indication of Hart's enthusiasm
for mechanization. As part of its advertised promise that Hart-
Parr tested each tractor engine before it left the plant, workers
attached each engine for twenty to forty hours to one of ten
direct-current electric generators that provided the plant's
needed power. These continuously filled the work space ir\side
the plant with the smell, noise, and smoke of ten operating in-
ternal combustion engines, prompting one writer to comment
that the "majestic roar of Niagara is low music" in comparison.
42. "Efficiency Management in a Gas Tractor Plant," Iron Trade Review 52
(1913), 49-60; Wooley, "Secrets of Business Success," 350. Hart-Parr used
similar systems of blocks and boards to keep inventory and schedule opera-
tions in the foundry.
43. W. E. Dodge, "Talking with Tacks," Factory 13 (May 1919), 931-33.
44. Like Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, and others. Hart understood
that expanding the factory's transportation links would serve his aims of
labor and market control. Although two rail lines, the Illinois Central and
the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, already served the plant site. Hart de-
termined that a link with the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad,
which passed nearby, would create a third competitor to bid for his business.
"A Freight and Passenger Railway Using Gasoline Motor Cars," Engineering
Record 62 (1910), 291-92; Norman Carlson, ed., Iowa Trolleys (Bulletin 114 of
the Central Railfans Association, [n.d.]), 251. Hart's plan to use gasoline-
powered locomotives proved to be unprofitable, and the railway converted
to electric power in 1915. As in other cases. Hart's insistence on innovative
engineering solutions often backfired. "Electrification of Charles City West-
em Ry.," Electric Traction 11 (December 1915), 743-48.
• I
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The tractor testing line at the Hart-Parr plant, c. 1915. Photo courtesy
Supposedly, Hart himself examined each test result before ap-
proving the painting, final assembly, and shipment.'*'^
Outside observers also praised Hart's strategies of shop
fioor management. Reflecting a commitment to efficient pro-
duction strategies taught in engineering school, as well as les-
sons in systematic management taught at the Burlington busi-
ness school, Hart-Pan had procedures and paperwork that
morütored virtually every step of shop practice. The payment
system, for example, differed from the piece-rate system com-
mon at other plants, since tasks were rated according to the total
cost budgeted rather than total time. Eoremen recorded each
machinist's work on a form and compared the productivity
with that of the company norm. Under this "modified day work
45. Wooley, "Secrets of Business Success," 347; "Efficiency Management in a
Gas Tractor Plant," 49-60; Porter, "Players in the Great Game: Charles W.
Hart," 408-10; "Iowa's Great Tractor Factory," 16.
r •
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system/' workers who regularly beat the rated cost received
increased pay. This provided incentive and immediate rewards,
"without the petty tyranny of foremen that sometimes domi-
nates shop floors." Such principles taught foremen to measure
employees' productivity against rigid standards of efficiency
rather than ones that permitted flexibility or negotiation. In this
era, Hart-Parr was admired for a system in which "the personal
question does not enter into the question of the man's ad-
vancement; he is judged entirely by his actual record."**
HART-PARR'S IMPRESSIVE STATURE both locally and
nationally declined considerably after 1914 due to a series of
poor decisions and unfortunate breaks. First, World War I hos-
tilities devastated the company's foreign markets.*'^  In response
to declining tractor sales, the company looked to munitions con-
tracts as an alternative. Hart spent several months in the eastern
Urüted States and Canada studying other shops and munitions
projects before presenting J. P. Morgan and Company with a
$1.5 rrullion bid to manufacture 9.2-inch artillery shells for the
British govemment. Morgan's agents were reportedly im-
pressed with Hart's "large knowledge of manufacturing meth-
ods, shop management and efficiency," and Hart-Parr beat out
one hundred firms to receive a contract in October 1915.**
Yet this triumph of Hart-Parr's reputation in manufacturing
and engineering did not ensure future success. To fulfill the
contract, the company converted the tractor plant into an arms
factory. Convinced that the machinery necessary for the shell
project did not exist on the market. Hart designed a unique
1,200-ton-capacity forge press and dozens of precision special-
purpose lathes. The project also required new drill presses, a
new steel foundry, and a new ventilation system, and demanded
that the factory become one of the largest copper casting fa-
46. "Efficiency Management in a Gas Tractor Plant," 51.
47. Hart-Parr's agent in Russia hurried home to avoid German advances.
With $100,000 left in unpaid orders, however, the company continued to
accept risky orders from Russia well into 1916. CCPEI, 7 July 1916.
48. Charles City Semi-Weekly News-Intelligencer, 1 October 1915; W. E. Dodge,
"An Iowa Factory's Response to Its Country's Call" (Charles City, n.d. [ca.
1919]), pamphlet in the R. C. Rolfing Collection, FCHS.
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One of the automatic lathes specially designed in Charles City for the
manufacture of World War One artillery shells. Photo courtesy FCHS.
cilities in the country. These short-term changes cost the firm
more than a half-million dollars. Wartime circumstances also in-
creased pressure on the local labor supply, and workers had
some difficulty meeting the precision standards that the British
goverrunent demanded.*'
In another response to declirüng markets and competition in
the marketplace, Hart-Parr reversed its traditional emphasis on
heavy, powerful machinery built for the large farms of the Great
Plains by reluctantly entering the small tractor market in 1915.
By that time, many American tractor manufacturers, most no-
tably Henry Ford, had recognized that wartime pressures on
food and labor markets had created a large demand for tractors
suitable for smaller farms in the East and Midwest. The "Little
Devil" was Hart-Parr's entry in the field. According to a com-
49. J. E. Cade, "How Hart-Parr Forgings Are Made in Their New 1200-Ton
Press," Hart-Parr Field and factory 2 Qanuary 1917), 3; L. M. Hansen, "How
Hart-Parr Makes Tractor Steel," Hart-Parr Field and Factory 2 (January 1917),
2; CCPEI, 24 and 25 November 1915, 23 June 1916. According to the author
of the Ellis family history. Hart's arrogance caused British officials to be extra
demanding during their inspections of shell quality. Otis, Our Ellises, 73.
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pany historian, the Little Devil's design "was simplicity itself,"
but it was brought to the market without adequate testing.
Due to its sensitivity to variations in temperature and humidity,
the machine did not operate reliably. Its poor balance was es-
pecially problematic, and at times the front wheels lifted en-
tirely off the ground while the back wheels buried themselves
deeper into the soil. The company's initial solution was to add
two hundred pounds of cement to weigh down the front
wheels, but that compromised steering. Moreover, its market-
ing strategy failed. Hart-Parr used a "mystery advertising"
approach, printing up thousands of postcards with nothing on
them but "THE LITTLE DEVIL IS COMING" in red type. The mail-
ing had no retum address, and the postmark did not reveal the
city. The strategy successfully generated attention, but it some-
times was misinterpreted. For instance, one Mar^itoba customer,
separated from his wife, saw the cards as a veiled threat of re-
venge from his wife's family and returned to his wife. Hart
himself did not seem to believe in the product. Even as the firm
was promoting its "Little Devil," Hart publicly challenged the
whole concept of small tractors. He predicted that the future
belonged to the one-hundred-horsepower models, and urged
farmers to delay buying a tractor until they could purchase a
machine able to "apply the greatest power to each acre." By
1917, Hart-Parr had dropped the whole line. Although the
company paid out liberal allowances to buy models back from
owners, the episode dramatically damaged the company's
. ,. so
reputation.
Matters came to a head during the winter of 1916-17. By
that time, Charles Hart's relationship with many prorrünent
dtizens in Charles City had decayed. Some of his actions cre-
ated anxiety and mounting pressure for change. In a speech
celebrating the opening of the Tractor Inn, for instance. Hart
charged that the dty council was "entirely incapable" of wise
and enterprising government. "Our company, as usual," he
said, "has had to do directly that which the town enterprise had
neither the foresight or [sic] the courage to undertake."
50. Mills, "History of Hart-Parr Co."; C. W. Hart, "Is the Little Tractor a Fail-
ure?" Farm Implement News 37 (13 April 1916), 20-21, 25.
51. CCPEÍ, 29 November 1916.
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In those tense times, Charles City banker A. E. Ellis, grow-
ing increasingly frustrated with the firm's demand for capital,
visited the plant almost daily. Holding $1.5 million in promis-
sory notes, and with the threat of a depositors' run on the barüc
in the air, Hart-Parr's financial backers met behind closed cur-
tains in the Ellis home to seek a solution. Even more ominous,
the British government canceled its order in March 1917, just as
production reached full capacity. With 90 percent of the plant
devoted to wartime production, the cancellation prompted the
firm's financiers to manipulate proxy voting, allowing a group
of stockholders from Chicago and Philadelphia to seize control
of the company. Following a May 1917 board meeting, the firm
announced Charles Hart's resignation. Walter Dray, a 28-year-
old MIT-trained manager, took over daily operations. That day,
the Tractor Ir\n closed its doors, with residents evicted the next
moming. Within weeks, virtually all of the old management at
Hart-Parr had announced their resignations."
The local newspaper welcomed the changing of the guard,
suggesting that Hart desperately needed "a rest," and hoping
that the new management would make the plant "more than a
thing of iron and steel."^^ Yet the newly configured Hart-Parr
Company faced a difficult transition period. Upon the congres-
52. Otis, Our Ellises, 69-73; C. H. Parr, "History of the Hart-Parr Company";
CCPEI, 28 April and 2 and 4 May 1917; CCDI, 3 May 1917; Mills, "History of
Hart-Parr Co., Founders of the Tractor Industry" The British government
feared that suppliers would soon be concentrating on the impending United
States war effort. Sir L. Worthington-Evans to Foreign Office, n.d. [ca. 8 Feb-
ruary 1917], "Memos on the Importance of American Supplies of Various
Munitions," DMRS, Mun 4-3204, folder 453, Public Record Office, London.
Many thanks to Grace Fleming for securing these documents, in view of steel
shortages and other wartime issues, the U.S. government was not concerned
with Hart-Parr's predicament. When the British canceled the contracts, Hart-
Parr's production was second-smallest among the eight American plants pro-
ducing 9.2-inch shells. Edward Reilly Stettinius to Brig. Gen. William Crozier,
7 April 1917, War Department folder, box 82, Papers of Edward Reilly Stet-
tinius Sr., Ace. #2723, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia
Library, Charlottesville.
53. CCDI, 10 May 1917. Soon after his resignation. Hart left for an eastern
vacation in his seven-passenger Willys-Knight sedan, before moving to a
ranch in Montana, where he entered the oil business. CCDP, 4 May 1917;
CCP, 29 April 1919 and 15 March 1937, Gilluly, "He Realized a Dream,"
chaps. 39-40; Mills, "History of Hart-Parr Co.," 19.
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sional declaration of war in 1917, Hart-Pan gained several mu-
nitions contracts with the United States govemment. The com-
pany produced a number of "anti-kaiser devices," including
steering and hoisting engines, steel wheels for military trucks,
and navy gun mounts.^ Still, there were additional hurdles. Un-
fortunately, the American military requested 9.5-inch shells; the
lathes built for Britain's 9.2-inch shells could not be converted
without tremendous cost.^ ^ Curiously, fifty of those lathes were
destroyed in a two-hundred-thousand-doUar fire just weeks after
the American govemment rejected the firm's efforts to secure a
contract to produce 9,5-inch shells. Hart-Pan was insured.^
THE TWO YEARS following the armistice were among the
most significant in the firm's early history. Sales soared during
the brief postwar agricultural boom, requiring a rapid expan-
sion of the w o^rk force. Hart-Pan did not escape the widespread
labor militancy in postwar America, however. In February and
March 1919, thirty-five machinists and helpers presented the
company with demands for increased wages and attempted to
form a union associated with the Intemational Association of
Machinists. Managers promptly fired all thirty-five, replaced
them with returning veterans, and refused to reinstate them
even when pressured to do so by representatives from the De-
partment ^^
54. Dodge, "An Iowa Factory's Response to Its Country's Call"; CCPEI, 1
and 27 August 1917; Edward Mott Wooley, "Winning the War with Motor Ve-
hicles," Collier's (4 January 1919), 15,30,63-65; and "Making Quad Wheels in a
Tractor Factory," The Foundry 47 (1 April 1919), 157-61.
55. Herbert Dillon to War Department, 13 April 1917; Adelbert E. Ellis to Hon.
Gilbert N. Haugen, 17 April 1917; MuniHons Standards Board to Donald E.
Davis, 19 May 1917, all in Record Group 61, War Industries Board, Chairman's
Office—General Correspondence, National Archives, Washington, DC.
56. The newspaper hinted at German espionage in this case. ! have not deter-
mined the true cause of the blaze. CCPEÍ, 10 October 1917; CCDI, 11 October
1917; "Fire at Hart-Parr Plant," Farm Implement News 38 (11 October 1917).
57. The federal mediator's report plainly concludes, "Undoubtedly, in my
judgement, the men were layed [sic] off becaijse they were starting a union.
However, there wasn't anything I could do in the matter." In contrast, under
the headline "Settlement of the Labor Question," the local newspaper re-
ported that the mediator found "nothing to conciliate" and insisted that the
matter was dropped. File 170-198, box 11, Ell, RG 280, Records of the Fed-
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The episode provoked Hart-Parr to respond with a number
of changes. On ¿le very day that the labor issue hit the news-
paper, the company initiated a series of informal, after-hours
"smokers" with employees, meetings that may have had no real
purpose other than to permit workers to vent their grievances
and to hear management's views. New corporate welfare pro-
grams also began, including a renewed emphasis on safety is-
sues, new home-building projects, the operung of the Hart-Parr
dispensary, and the end of the Saturday afternoon shift, offering
workers Üie benefit of free bus service to the VWldwood golf
course.^ *
A second stockholders' revolt occurred in December 1919,
when local investors purchased the controlling stock. A new
management team led by Charles City banker C. D. Ellis—
Hart's original financier—and his son Melvin W. Ellis took
control of the firm; Walter Dray suddenly resigned as general
manager. The new board quickly brought another round of
changes to Hart-Parr operations. They purchased Charles
Hart's remaining shares in both Hart-Parr and the Charles
City Westem Railway, declared the firm's first dividends since
1914, and created a new profit-sharing plan for salaried em-
ployees who had been with the firm for at least two years. The
eligibility requirement in effect redefined what made a worker
a successful breadwinner: longevity gained precedence over
mechanical skill. Inside the plant, engineers replaced the loud
and smoky tractor testing method with a new system that
shifted inspection duties to foremen working the day shift.
The new managers also announced that field "experts" would
no longer perform routine service calls for customers; instead,
the company began to emphasize its arrangements with tractor
schools that would replace correspondence courses and train
farmers to conduct their own repairs. The title of the company's
in-house magazine also reflected the new approach: the new
magazine, Hart-Parrtners, replaced the joumal Field and Factory
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service, National Archives II, College Park,
MD; CCPEI, 6 March 1919. Labor issues are also discussed in CCPEI, 24 and
28 February, 1,3,5, and 18 March, and 28 April 1919.
58. CCPEI, 8 and 10 April and 3 May 1919.
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produced under Hart's tenure.^" A new column in the local
newspaper that featured brief biographies of enaployees—
mainly managers and foremen—further seemed to signal a de-
parture from the previous emphasis on labor management and
control. Similarly, a new commitment to family-oriented com-
pany picnics replaced the masculinity and individualism of
the company entertairunent that had prevailed during Hart's
tenure.** In general, these initiatives suggest that the new man-
agement team replaced the ethos of efficiency and engineering
with a new emphasis on building relationships with white-
collar employees, dealers, and customers.
Despite tiie impressive boom in sales in 1919 and into the
next year, tractor sales began to plummet nationwide by mid-
1920. The economic crisis of 1920-21, one of the most intense up-
heavals in American economic history, lingered in the Midwest
for several additional years. The agricultural depression devas-
tated the tractor industry. Dozens of tractor firms failed alto-
gether in the early 1920s, and for several years, only the small
and inexpensive Fordson tractor increased its sales/' Unfortu-
59. CCPEI, 1, 2, and 18 December 1919, 3 and 31 January, 12 April, and 14 May
1920; "New Hart-Parr Manager," Farm Implement NeiDS 40 (11 December 1919),
23.
60. Allen B. Howes, hired as the new employment manager in 1919, boasted
of Hart-Parr's selective hiring strategies. Howes claimed that company "em-
ployees consist of 'white men,' not a class of men who are going to be a
source of trouble." CCPEI, 19 August 1919. In any case, the declining labor
force and changes in immigration patterns meant that few new immigrants
came to work at Hart-Parr. The column of biographies, "We Have with Us
Today," appeared in CCPEI in numerous issues, August-November 1919.
61. Fordson had 25 percent of the market by 1919, and nearly 75 percent of
the market by the niid-1920s. Ford R. Bryan, Beyond the Model T: Vie Other
Ventures of Henry Ford (Detroit, 1990), 15-23; Reynold M. Wik, Henry Ford and
Grass-Roots America (Ann Arbor, MI, 1972); Hurt, Agricultural Technology in
the Twentieth Century, 16-17; and G. B. Gunlogson, "What's Ahead for the
Tractor Companies," unpublished report, April 1930, R. C. Rolfing Papers,
FCHS. After World War I, journalists transferred their admiration for Hart-
Parr's tractor manufacturing methods to the Fordson plant. See J. Edward
Schipper, "Ford Tractor Production Plan Unchanged in Growth," Automotive
Industries 38 (1918), 621-24, 662; J. Edward Schipper, "Fordson Tractor As-
sembly Wholly a Progressive Plan," ibid. 40 (1919), 895-901, 930, and 960-66;
and John H. Van Deventer, "Ford Principles and Practice at River Rouge,"
part 11, "Machining Tractor Parts and Assembling Ford Tractors," Industrial
Management 56 Ouly 1923), 19-27.
The Hart-Parr Co. 365
nately for Hart-Parr, its tractors no longer served the typical
tractor customer; its heavy and powerful machine, suitable for
virgin soils in the wheat belt, was inappropriate for the row
crops of smaller farmers in the Midwest. The cumulative prob-
lems meant that Hart-Parr sales fell 90 percent between 1920
and 1924."
Declining sales demanded new marketing strategies and a
more flexible approach to manufacturing. In rather desperate
attempts to compete with Fordson's low prices, Hart-Parr
slashed tractor prices, guaranteed customers a refund in case
of price reductions, and promised to underwrite loans that local
banks made to Hart-Parr customers." After weeks of satirizing
rumors of an impending plant shutdown, the factory did in-
deed close in October for an "inventory" that, for many em-
ployees, lasted forever. In the midst of these crises, the com-
pany sponsored a "hard-timers'" party on Halloween—with
no white-collar workers permitted—a somewhat duplicitous
response to workers' frustrations." Production records reveal
that the company deliberately depleted inventories and aban-
doned any remnant of the old strategy of high-volume pro-
duction. Instead, the firm shifted to batch production, manu-
facturing goods in small lots in response to specific customer
orders. In the two fiscal years spanning November 1921 to
November 1923, there were forty-four weeks in which the
company manufactured no thirty-horsepower tractors—Hart-
Parr's best-selling model.*^ The factory began to accept orders
on a custom basis. Then, in the late 1920s, the company em-
barked on another variation in manufacturing by alternating
three weeks of producing its most popular models with one
62. The decline in sales is reported in an unpublished Hart-Parr sales manual
[ca. 1928], folder 83, box 85, Higgins Collection. As sales collapsed during
the agricultural depression of the early 1920s, the company slashed prices 38
to 43 percent on the main models. "Reduces Tractor Prices," Farm Implement
News 43 (8 June 1922), 9.
63. CCP, 29 September and 2 October 1920; TAWN, 6 June 1922.
64. CCP, 18 and 28 October and 5 November 1920, 30 December 1921.
65. The twenty-horsepower tractor fared even worse; in 38 weeks of the fiscal
year 1921-22 and 25 weeks of fiscal year 1922-23, the plant produced not one
H-P 20. 1921-22 and 1922-23 ProducHon Records, R. C. Rolfing Collection,
FCHS. Another plant shutdown is mentioned in CCDN, 5 November 1920.
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week of manufacturing its less popular model.** The firm's
new emphasis on outsourcing work for the tractor's compo-
nent parts points to another sharp contrast with the past.
Whereas promoters in the 1910s stressed the quality of Hart-
Parr engineering, boasting that virtually all component parts
were manufactured in Charles City, advertisements of the
1920s often stressed the quality and name-brand reputation of
its suppliers." Unable to compete successfully with Ford and
Fordism, Hart-Parr recast its approach to manufacturing and
marketing.
The firm's renewed commitment to advertising and sales
also suggests that Hart-Parr was looking for a niche as a batch
rather than a mass producer. Dave Darrah, manager of sales
promotion, complained that previous tractor sales campaigns
put excessive emphasis on horsepower, engineering, and the
particular qualities of specific machines and brands. Darrah's
approach was to introduce dealers to the Hart-Parr "system of
sales."** Recogrüzing that many farmers remained convinced
that horse teams offered advantages in terms of cost and ma-
nure production, Darrah's strategy was to sell the tractor idea in
general. In the new marketing scheme, old definitions of exper-
tise were turned on their head: for example, one advertisement
depicted a farmer instructing a Hart-ParT engineer how to de-
sign a tractor. Marketers continued to mention the power of
Hart-Parr tractors, but placed a new emphasis on their lighter
weight, ease of operation, and the sheet metal that completely
enclosed the motor and hid it from view.^ Hart-Parr also em-
phasized its tractors' compatibility with implements produced
by other firms, and Darrah urged a cooperative approach to
farm machinery advertising through industry associations such
66.1928-29 Production Records, R. C. Rolfing CoUecHon, FCHS.
67. "Equipment Used on Hart-Parr Tractors," Farm Implement News 46 (12
February 1925), 26-38; "Iowa's Great Tractor Factory," 14.
68. "Hart-Parr Conventions," Farm Implement Neias 42 (20 January 1921), 15.
69. "Hart-Parr 1923 Models," Farm Implement News 44 (1 February 1923), 22;
"Detailed Changes Made in Hart-Parr Tractors," Automotive Industries 48 (15
February 1923), 318; Hart-Parr advertisement, Southem Ruralist 29 (15 March
1923), 666. In contrast, Hart-Parr tractors designed before World War I left
many gears, belts, and parts uncovered.
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ABUNDANT POWER FOR THREE PLOWS.WEIGHS 5150 LBS
NINETEEN TRACTOR BUILDIN
A farmer advises a Hart-Parr engineer on tractor design in this adver-
tisement in Charles City Daily Press, 15 March 1920.
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as the National Institute of Power Farming.™ As one Hart-Parr
consultant frarJdy put it, tractor manufacturers needed to rec-
ognize that "salability," rather than the quality of the product,
was the key to overcoming farmers' reluctance/'
The company's relationship with its sales force also changed
significantly in Ü\e 1920s. Shifting from a system of agents who
contacted the company with news of prospects, the new system
relied on dealers committed to the Hart-Parr brand. Salesmen
were taught that the firm's founders were "two farmer boys"—•
overlooking their engineering talents and training—and that
Hart-Parr tractors "are built for the man who is going to use
them—^not for the 'book learned' engineer."^
The evolution of the company logo further illustrates Hart-
Parr's metamorphosis. In 1916 the company relied on the sim-
ple slogan, "Oil Tractor Specialists." A 1920 logo demonstrated
the firm's commitment to its traditional niche as a manufac-
turer of large and powerful tractors; the logo's copy proudly
boasted "Abundant Power for Three Plows. Weighs 5158 Lbs."
Similarly, in a 1922 advertisement boasting that the firm had
"no side lines," the logo's slogan declared, "powerful sturdy
kerosene tractors; founders of the tractor industry." The new
corporate identity of 1924 revealed Hart-Parr's sudden and
70. Dave E. Darrah, "Selling the Power Farming Idea," Farm Implement Nexos
44 (15 February 1923), 14-16; Dave E. Darrah, "The Merits of Tractor Power
on the Farm," published text of a radio address (Charles City, 1925), pam-
phlet in collections of the State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.
71. Gunlogson, "Whafs Ahead for Tractor Companies?" 2O-21. Hart-Parr's
shift from marketing its product on the basis of mechanical qualities to pulling
sales from customers by creating a perceived need reflected a common trend in
the decade after World War I. See Arthur J. Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938:
Designing the General Motors Performance-Control System (University Park, PA,
1968); Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Mod-
ernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley, CA, 1985); and Scranton, Endless Novelty.
71. Mills, "History of Hart-Parr Co.," 19-23; Hart-Parr advertisement. Farm
Implement News 45 (6 March 1924), 36; 1928 Sales Manual, section 6. The shift
to a more cordial relationship with dealers parallels similar developments in
the auto industry, where Ford's model of treating dealers as mere company
employees was in trouble by the mid-1920s. See Thomas A. Dicke, Franchising
in America: The Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC,
1992).
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HART-PARR
FOUNDERS OF THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY
WASHING MACHINES-AIRCOMPRESSORS-COMMERCIAL CASTINGS
Compare this 1924 logo with the one from 1920 at the bottom of the
advertisement reprinted on page 367. From Farm Implemer\t News,
25 December 1924.
enthusiastic embrace of a new strategy of diversification." List-
ing the firm's complete line of "kerosene tractors, stationary en-
gines, feed mills, washing machines, air compressors, and com-
mercial castings," the slogan correlated with President Melvin
EUis's admission that wartime murùdor^ work had led to in-
debtedness, and that the company's experiment with the Little
Devil tractor had been "a horrible failure."" While the efforts to
make Charles City "the grey iron and semi-steel casting center
of Iowa" benefited the company over the long term, the strategy
to reintroduce stationary engines and add lines of air compres-
sors, feed grinders, and washing machines did not succeed in
markets that were just as competitive as the tractor sector.
These maneuvers notwithstanding, the company rebounded
only when the agricultural economy recovered modestly in the
mid-1920s. In 1925, the company recorded dramatic sales in-
creases that impressed agricultural implement dealers around
the Midwest. After years of "sales resistance," Hart-Parr dealers
in Illinois sold 150 tractors in the dead of winter 1924-25.'^  A
73. Thresherman's Review and Power Farming 24 (May 1915), 4; CCPEI, 20 Feb-
ruary 1920; Farm Implement News 43 (7 December 1922), 27; ibid. 45 (25 De-
cember 1924), 31.
74. Melvin W. Ellis to the security holders of Hart-Parr Company, 23 May
1925, folder 78, box 83, Higgins Collection.
75. CCPEI, 20 March 1919; TAWN, 2 ar\d 16 January and 13 February 1925, 27
April 1926,18 November 1927. See also Wendel, Oliver Hart-Parr, 82-84.
76. Three hundred thirty Charles City residents celebrated at a breakfast by
singing "I'd Rather Belong to the Hart-Parr Gang than Anything Else I Know."
"Charles Cityans [sic] Entertain Men from Illinois at Huge Banquet and
Speech-Fest," unidentified newspaper clipping [TAWN7], 10 February 1925,
in vertical files, FCHS. See also TAWN, 3 February 1925.
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"Prosperity Special" train loaded with $250,000 in cargo sparked
parades, dinners, and other festivities across Iowa and Illinois.
Notably, the acclaim focused on the salesmen—the "hustlers"—
who secured the orders, not the engineers who designed the
tractors nor the workers who built them. Indeed, articles attrib-
uted the campaign's success to dealers' abilities to sell a tractor
for the farmer's farm, "rather than for the glorification of the
engineers."" In contrast, one sales campaign initiated during
Hart's tenure had explicitly chastised tractor firms that relied on
"fine salesmanship" rather than the product.^ ^
As the market for farm machinery improved further in the
later 1920s and "Prosperity Specials" continued to roll out of
Charles City, Hart-Parr's sales grew steadily from 1925 to 1928."
Yet the firm could not ignore trends in the farm tractor and farm
machinery business. Soon after 1922, when the Intemational
Harvester Farmall tractor introduced its efficient power take-off
system, it became almost imperative for tractor firms to merge
with companies that manufactured compatible plows, harrows,
and other farm implements. Consequently, on April 1, 1929,
Hart-Parr joined three other firms to form the Oliver Farm
Equipment Company of Chicago.'^Thus ended the independent
life of tractor manufacturing in Charles City. The plant contin-
ued to produce tractors, tractor parts, and castings into the
1990s, but it never again played a dominant role in the industry.
THE HISTORY OF "THE HART-PARR" reflects several trends
in the history of American manufacturing and management. As
an aspiring mass producer of farm tractors, Charles Hart em-
77. "Selling Trainloads of Tractors to Farmers in the Middle of the Winter,"
Farm Implement News 46 (12 March 1925), 26-38.
78. "The Plant Behind Your Hart-Parr Tractor," Hart-Parr Field and Factory 2
Qanuary 1917), 8-9.
79. TAY/N, 28 February and 9 October 1928, 22 January and 1 August 1929;
CCDP, 23 February 1929. The 9 October 1928 article reports that 1926 tractor
sales were up 38 percent over 1925; 1927 sales were up 35 percent over 1926;
and sales during the first ten months of 1928 were 32 percent above the same
period in 1927.
80. The other firms were the Oliver Chilled Plow Co. of South Bend, Indiana;
the Nichols and Shepard Threshing Machine Co. of Battle Creek, Michigan;
and the American Seeding Machine Co. of Springfield, Ohio.
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ployed principles used in other industries—engineering, sys-
temization, rationalization, efficiency, and labor control—to
help build Hart-Parr into one of the largest industrial firms in
Iowa and one of the dominant players in the American tractor
industry. Hart adopted the ideals of factory design, mass pro-
duction, and scientific management that provided the basis for
several successful American industries. Those ideals also had a
profound impact on the economy and society of Charles City, as
Hart and his colleagues tried to persuade the town's residents
to accept those broader national trends.
Yet Hart's principles could not be sustained. Tractor pro-
ducers lacked sufficient market presence to employ strategies of
bulk and mass production, and tractors were simply too large
and too heavy to be readily accommodated within a dynamic
system of assembly line production. Even at peak production,
Hart-Parr never fully achieved the Fordist model. Hundreds of
skilled employees performed the 2,250 machining operatior\s
that went into each finished product, while dozens of haulers
and laborers performed unskilled tasks by hand. Thus, while
Hart-Parr could produce about one hundred tractors per week
in 1919, Fordson was producing about twenty-five hundred per
week that same year.*' Further, the specialized nature of the
farm market and the expense of making the transition from
horses made farmers reluctant to embrace the tractor and kept
sales volume relatively small.*^ Tractor sales could not support
the mass production techniques pioneered in the automobile
industry.
By 1917, wartime circumstances and a misplaced emphasis
on large and powerful tractors left the company in dire straits.
Although a period of prosperity retumed in 1919 and 1920, the
agricultural depression, growing labor agitation, and the inher-
ent limitations of the mass production model convinced the
company to redirect its efforts fundamentally. Under a new
81. CCPEI, 20 August and 29 March 1919; B. CaldweU, "Building 30-H.p. Trac-
tor," American Machinist (1 May 1919), 853-55; Bryan, Beyond the Model T, 22.
82. Sally Clarke, "New Deal Regulation and the Revolution in American Farm
Productivity: A Case Study of the Diffusion of the Tractor in the Com Belt,
1920-1940," joumal of Economic History 51 (1991), 101-24; Robert E. Ankli,
"Horses vs. Tractors in the Com Belt," Agricultural History 54 (1980), 134-48.
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management team, the company found batch production, ag-
gressive marketing, diversification of the product line, and co-
operation with related farm machinery businesses to be the only
hope for survival. The same company that had focused on pro-
ductivity during the prewar era of systemization shifted its fo-
cus to distribution in an effort to adapt to the changing markets
and emerging consumer culture of the 1920s. In brief, this study
confirms recent efforts to revise the standard view of American
industrialization, with its emphasis on assembly line produc-
tion, mass marketing, and rigorous control and deskilling of
industrial labor.
Since 1930, Charles City's manufacturing history has re-
flected further trends in the transformation of American indus-
try. The merger with Oliver proved profitable for the company,
and it maintained a strong market share through the 1930s
while smaller and less integrated firms fell by the wayside. Like
other American industries, the Charles City plant reached its
peak of productivity in the two decades following World War 11,
and a major plant expansion in 1958 signaled Oliver's commit-
ment to the Charles City site. The work force also fared rela-
tively well, particularly as wages rose and working conditior^s
improved following the formation of a local of the Urüted Farm
Equipment & Metal Workers of America in 1943/^
After 1960, when the White Motor Company acquired
Oliver Farm Equipment and its tractor factory, the Charles City
plant became a pawn in several Wall Street maneuvers. The
company's sales and profitability continued to grow into the
mid-1970s, but began to decline steadily thereafter as just a few
firms dominated the American tractor noarket. The plant changed
hands several times since 1980, when the White Motor Corpo-
ration filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As the factory's subse-
quent owners sought to consolidate manufacturing operations
within their ever larger corporate structures, a commensurate
decline in the Charles City work force ensued. In the mid-1980s,
the plant's managers garnered national attention once again,
this time for its efforts to terminate health benefits for retirees.
83. "Agreement between Oliver Local 115, U.F.E. & M.W.A., C.I.O., and Man-
agement, Charles City, Iowa Works, Oliver Farm Equipment Company,"
[1943], property of Leiand Blanchard.
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The last tractor rolled off the line in Charles City in 1988, and
the plant closed its doors forever in 1993."
The rise and fall of tractor manufacturing in Charles City
illustrates the complexity, variety, and indeterminacy of the
American industrial past. Many histories of business and tech-
nology focus on stories of inspired innovation and successful
management, implying that firms that mastered shop floor effi-
ciency, marketing creativity, and effective labor control were
bound to succeed over less enterprising rivals. But the history of
Hart-Parr and its successor corporations demonstrates that tri-
umph was not inevitable for such firms. Despite Hart-Parr's
notoriety and profitability early in the century, the approach
based on maximizing labor and manufacturing efficiency failed
in the midst of World War One. In the 1920s the new manage-
ment adopted alternate strategies, such as diversifying product
lines, intensifying advertising, and moderating the production
process. Such maneuvers sustained the company through hard
economic times, leaving the firm well positioned to benefit from
the consolidation trends that swept the industry in the late 1920s.
Subsequent manufacturing and marketing decisions kept the
company afioat for another six decades, making it one of the
last survivors of the long retrenchment in the farm equipment
sector. In the end, however, fiscal concerns of corporate capital-
ism overwhelmed the plant and its ability to compete in a post-
industrial society. As a cor\sequence, Charles City, Iowa, birth-
place of the farm tractor, will produce tractors no more.
84. For a survey of the decline of the Charles City plant, see Hanson and
Hull, eds.. Past Harvest, and various issues of the Hart-Parr Oliver Collector,
especially Larry Gay's regular column titled "Historical Highlights." On the
health benefits issue, see Judy Greenwald, "Firms Can Cut Retirees Health
Benefits: Court," Business Insurance 20 (12 May 1986), 1, 35.

